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Handke's Kaspar, Wittgenstein's Tractates, 
and the successful representation of alienation 
James R. Hamilton 
The prologue to Peter Handke's play Kaspar begins with these words: 
The play Kaspar does not show how IT REALLY IS or REALLY 
WAS with Kaspar Hauser. It shows what is POSSIBLE with 
someone. It shows how someone can be made to speak through 
speaking. The play could also be called speech torture} 
The prologue concludes with this remark: "(While the audience comes in and as 
they wait for the play to begin, this text might be read softly over the 
microphones, and repeated over and over" [K61]). Accordingly, the next 
sentences would be, again, the first sentences of the introduction: "The play 
Kaspar does not show how IT REALLY IS or REALLY WAS with Kaspar 
Hauser. . . . The play could also be called speech torture" The prologue 
continues by providing a detailed description of the staging devices to be 
employed in the performance, to be used "to formalize this torture." Among the 
devices will be voices that address the protagonist, voices whose "manner of 
speaking should be that of voices which in reality have a technical medium 
interposed between themselves and the listeners" (telephones, bullhorns, records, 
microphones [K59]). We are also told that "the audience does not see the stage 
as a representation of a room that exists somewhere . . . the stage represents the 
stage" (K60). The objects on the stage are to appear theatrical, to be "instantly 
recognizable as props." The objects "have no history." The spectators, moreover, 
are not to be able, from what is there, to "imagine that, before they came in and 
saw the stage, some tale had already taken place on it," nor to "be in a position 
to imagine that there [will be] a sequel to [some] story." They are to recognize 
that they "will not experience a story but watch a theatrical event" (K60). 
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Embedded in this prologue are several interrelated ideas about the nature of 
theatrical representation and its relevance to our lives. Also hinted at there is a 
certain kind of closeness between the project being carried out in Kaspar and the 
philosophical theory of meaning to be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus.2 A connection between Handke and Wittgenstein is often 
noted. But to my knowledge no one has attempted to investigate the theory of 
meaning in the Tractatus with a view to assessing how much of the aims, 
structure, and thematics of Kaspar can thereby be illuminated.3 I will argue that 
reading Kaspar in light of the Tractatus provides a way both to articulate 
Handke's aims in the piece and to show how its structure achieves the realization 
of those aims. I will also argue that an understanding of the ways in which the 
Tractarian theory of meaning is inadequate will provide us with a way of 
measuring that achievement of those aims as an "achievement." In particular, I 
will argue that the limitations Handke places on theatrical representation in 
Kaspar, limitations shared by the Tractarian theory of meaning, prevent Handke 
from examining some of the most important features of that "alienation from 
language" that he wished to explore in the play. 
I: Handke's theatrical intentions, and the problems of Kaspar 
The voices that are to speak to Kaspar in the play are to sound as though 
there were a "technical medium interposed" between them and "the listeners." 
We will want to discuss the implications of the "technical medium" being 
"interposed;" but notice first that it is "voices" that speak and "listeners" that hear 
this speaking—it is not "characters in a play." There are, in a sense, no 
characters in Kaspar. The play "does not show how it . . . really was with 
Kaspar Hauser . . . it shows how it is possible with someone" (K59). This will 
be a very abstract someone; for, like his historical namesake, the figure in the 
play has no history.4 Connected to this is the idea that the objects are to be 
"immediately recognizable as props . . . they are play objects . . . they [too] have 
no history" (K60). These elements, we are told, are to enable the players "to 
formalize" the possibility we are about to be shown (K59)—they are also to 
prevent us from imagining we are about to "experience a story" and to alert us 
that we are, instead, going "to watch a theatrical event" (K60). What does 
Handke have in mind here that is characteristic of a "theatrical event"? 
Within a month of the first performance of Kaspar Handke published a brief 
critical article that sheds light on the intentions expressed in the prologue to 
Kaspar.5 In the article Handke focuses in on what he calls "the fatal limitations 
of the scope of the performance and of its relevance," claiming that "the theatre's 
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sphere of relevance is determined by the extent that everything that is serious, 
important, unequivocal, conclusive outside the theater becomes play"6 Here 
Handke is setting up a distinction between the world outside the theater—where 
there are serious things going on—and the events inside the theater—where 
everything is transformed into 'play.' This point becomes the basis of his 
criticism of Brecht, whose plays not only reveal contradictions within the ways 
we think but also offer solutions to the conditions that produce such conflicted 
thinking. Handke argues that solutions offered in Brecht's theatrical presentations 
happen "purely as a matter of form, a play."7 As such they are solutions only in 
a play. At this point what drives the argument is the connection Handke makes 
between "play" and "form." "The theatre formalizes every movement, every 
insignificant detail, every word, every silence; it is no good at all when it comes 
to suggesting solutions, at most it is good for playing with contradictions."8 
So far, the argument appears to be this: 
(a) Everything that is presented in the theater is formalized and 
therefore becomes play, a play of forms, play with form, play upon 
form. 
Therefore: 
(b) Just insofar as theater attempts to represent events outside the 
theater, it is a falsification both of the reality it formally represents and 
of the formal structures of theater within which the representation 
takes place. 
When this argument is applied to the instance of Brechtian theatrical 
practice, we can only further conclude: 
(c) Attempts, like Brecht's, to bring important issues into the theater 
by means of the representation in theatrical performances of conditions 
and solutions to conditions outside the theater have been useful but, in 
the end, prove seriously misguided.9 
In contrast, Handke proposes an alternative form of theater. 
What it could be good few (and has previously been good for) is an 
area of play for the creation of the spectator's innermost, hitherto 
undiscovered areas of play, as a means by which the individual's 
awareness becomes not broader but more precise, as a means of 
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becoming sensitive, of becoming susceptible, of reacting, as a means 
of coming into the world.10 
When doing this, Handke claims, "the theatre is not then portraying the 
world "" 
To attempt to achieve what theater is good for would seem to require 
creating a non-representational theater, an analogy perhaps with non-figurative 
painting. What this will look like is already suggested and illustrated by Handke 
in the Sprechstiicke that were written and performed in 1965-66.12 Handke calls 
these "spectacles without pictures" that "give no picture of the world." They are 
pieces for the theater "inasmuch as they employ natural forms of expression 
found in reality . . . such expressions as are natural in real speech . . . speech 
forms that are uttered orally in real life" that therefore "need . . . at least one 
person who listens."13 Notice that here, as in Kaspar, there are no characters in 
the usual sense, only listeners. Nor will the Sprechstiicke have any action, "since 
every action on stage would only be a picture of another action" and, as such, 
would be a formalization—a falsification—of both the action pictured and the 
formal play of theater as well. Surely Handke is correct here if he thinks that 
these are interconnected phenomena. For, to describe someone's action, or to 
describe someone as acting in a certain manner, requires reference to that 
person's dispositions and intentions.14 Inasmuch as dispositions and intentions are 
not momentary, but relatively enduring, features of a personality, their description 
in turn must refer to the person in a temporal context of interaction with 
others—in short, in a story. Absent characters, actions, and stories, what is left 
is . . . words: words that "give no picture of the world . . . that don't point at the 
world as something lying outside the words but to the world in the words 
themselves . . . [that] give no picture of the world but a concept of it."15 
In sum, in order to create a theater that does not confuse the reality outside 
the theater and the transformation into play of everything inside the theater, 
Handke urges us to abjure the standard means of theatrical representation: 
characters, stories, and referential uses of language that goes along with 
representing people in the context of their stories. But Handke complicates 
matters considerably in moving from the Sprechstiicke to Kaspar. In the former 
he clearly attempts a theater that eschews narrative representation. In Kaspar, 
however, there is a series of events that looks sufficiently plotted that it has 
tempted most commentators to present their synopses of the play in the form of 
an abstract story. Along with the appearance of plotting comes, inevitably, the 
appearance of a character—there is, after all, a protagonist. The protagonist has 
a gender and a name. He has a name, moreover, that has historical and theatrical 
antecedents that raise expectations concerning his behavior, some part of the 
course of a life. So it can seem that all of the standard means of theatrical 
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representation so successfully avoided in the Sprechstiicke actually exist in 
Kaspar despite the explicit statements in the Prologue to the contrary.16 
In section IV I will argue that the examination of Kaspar in light of the 
Tractatus will enable us to see how Kaspar can have both the appearance and the 
effect of a plotted structure without containing character, real action, or an 
underlying narrative.17 To make that case I must first lay down an account of the 
sequence of events in Kaspar and provide a precis of Wittgenstein's project in 
the Tractatus and of its failure. 
H: A sequence of events in Kaspar 
When one reads Kaspar it is obvious that the piece has sixty-five numbered 
sections. [One striking resemblance between the written texts of Kaspar and the 
Tractatus is the fact that they both appear in the form of numbered divisions.] 
But the numbered divisions in Kaspar are not connected in any obvious way to 
the text as a theater-script. For that purpose, we need to note the indications in 
the text for changes in the stage-lighting. This gives us the divisions of the piece 
as experienced by an audience: following the Prologue, during which the stage 
lights are up, there are five scenes followed by a set of sixteen very short 
"blackout scenes;" then a sixth scene followed in turns by an intermission and 
two final scenes.18 
The first scene begins with some activity behind the back curtain indicating 
that someone is trying to get through. After considerable effort Kaspar appears. 
He stands still for a moment, long enough for the audience to see he is wearing 
a mask expressing astonishment and confusion. (That he is wearing a mask is 
not to be immediately apparent.) He moves. Like his theatrical namesake, the 
puppet in Punch and Judy, he is clumsy, out of control. After several perilous 
moments, he succeeds in falling. After a few moments, he utters the sentence "I 
want to be a person like somebody else was once." He repeats it several 
times—until it is clear to the audience that he does not understand it.19 In the 
next sequence of movements, Kaspar will (1) utter his sentence in tones that 
suggest commands, questions, expressions of happiness, relief, and so on, (2) rise, 
walk clumsily about knocking into the randomly placed bits of furniture, and 
address each with his sentence, and (3) finally, by accident, manage to open the 
doors of a large wardrobe. At this point the audience hears voices from various 
sides speaking in short paragraphs which are punctuated by Kaspar uttering his 
sentence. These voices are called the "Prompters." 
In the next four scenes Kaspar, by turns, has his sentence "exorcised,"20 is 
made to speak the ordered speech of his Prompters, assesses his present abilities 
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as the power to order objects, expresses the hope of being able now to say 
important things with the sentences at his disposal, affirms himself,21 is 
undermined by the prompters, threatened. The Prompters tell him he can become 
useful, that "even if there are no limits, [he] can draw them," that he can become 
orderly and quiet—and once again the effect is a threat. In the brightest light the 
prompters say, "You have been cracked open." It gets dark. After a moment 
they say, "You become sensitive to dirt" (K 103). 
In the first nine of the sixteen short "blackouts," several "other Kaspars" 
appear. They are dressed like Kaspar 1, and are also wearing masks expressing 
astonishment. The Kaspars mime various things—movements, pains, sounds, the 
return of things to an order—upon cue from the prompters. (None of the Kaspars 
relate to each other in any obvious way.) In the remainder, Kaspar 1 engages in 
various tasks (opening one hand with the other against resistance only to reveal 
an empty hand, chasing himself around a bit, as though to catch himself, closing 
the wardrobe doors); each task or image is punctuated by darkness. [It is 
noteworthy that the Prompters never appear again.] 
The next scene opens with Kaspar in bright light assuming various poses. 
He then turns to the audience and declares himself healthy, strong, conscientious, 
honest, frugal, a model citizen . . . all this, because he has command of speech. 
He turns to leave, starts back, repeats the leaving and starting back, repeats it 
again: and then leaves rapidly. Once he is gone the wardrobe doors slowly 
swing open. 
During the intermission there are voices piped over loud speakers into the 
lobby, and even into the street outside. These sentences are marked 
simultaneously by precise grammatical regularity and a lack of actual grammatical 
intelligibility. The effect, perhaps the theme, of these sentences is violence. 
Following this intermission Kaspar re-enters confidently upon a stage 
already populated by the other Kaspars. He begins the first of several attempts 
to describe his education into speech in honorific terms. But the other Kaspars 
rise and advance on him making increasingly disruptive noises. Kaspar is again, 
as he was when his original sentence was exorcised, reduced to fragmented 
speech. 
In the final brief scene Kaspar stands burdened by the impossibility of his 
situation and its inescapability—"I cannot rid myself of myself anymore." He is 
reduced to grotesque comparisons: "candles and bloodsuckers: ice and mosquitoes: 
horses and puss." The play ends with Kaspar repeating with phrase, "Goats and 
monkeys" (the phrase of Othello's despair over human rapacity). With each 
repetition the curtain jerks towards the center where the Kaspars are standing, 
finally knocking them down. The play is over. 
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HI: The argument and the failure of Wittgenstein's Tractates 
The project, as Wittgenstein described it, is this: 
to set a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the 
expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set a limit to thought, 
we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should 
have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore 
only be in language that the limit can be set, and what lies on the 
other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.22 
This project is clearly in the Kantian tradition, not only in its attempt to describe 
the phenomena of thought and language "only from within language" but also 
because it construes the primary function of language to be the representation of 
thoughts. These points are also related: the way Wittgenstein understood the 
representation of thought in language determined how the limits to thought and 
language were to be scribed. 
In this context we encounter Wittgenstein's famous "picture theory" of 
meaning: the first decisive move in Wittgenstein's account of representation is 
to treat all forms of representation as pictorial in character and logic.23 The 
second is to recognize that pictures are, in a certain sense, not pictures of objects 
at all but of situations (arrangements of objects, if you like). This pair of ideas 
leads to the notion that it is not names but sentences that are basic to linguistic 
meaning. "We picture facts to ourselves" (TLP, 2.1). But, "situations can be 
described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions like 
arrows—they have sense" [TLP, 3.144]). So, "only propositions have sense; only 
in the nexus of a proposition does a name have a meaning" (TLP, 3.3). 
This connection between pictures and propositions—sentences that are used 
to describe and explain the world—needs further explanation. That explanation 
in turn will make prominent the idea that becomes central to the setting of limits 
to the sayable: the idea of "logical form." What Wittgenstein had in mind by the 
expression, "proposition," can be understood by considering the fact that the same 
content can be asserted in the active and the passive voice: the proposition, we 
may say, is that which is shared by the two expressions of the proposition. The 
picture theory helps not only to clarify but also to extend this point. In a picture, 
what might be called the 'elements' of the picture correspond to objects; and they 
represent those objects. But what is crucial is that "what constitutes a picture is 
that its elements are related to each other in a determinate way" (TLP, 2.14) and 
not that they are produced in a particular way. The emphasis on the relation of 
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elements in a picture over the way the elements are produced is explained in the 
following remark: "the fact that the elements of a picture are related to one 
another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in 
the same way" (TLP, 2.15). From this we also can see how a picture can be said 
to be true or false—it depends upon whether the possible situation it represents 
actually obtains. Just so, Wittgenstein held, "what constitutes a propositional sign 
is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one 
another" (TLP, 3.14). And, "a proposition is a picture of reality . . . [it] is a 
model of reality as we imagine [think of] it"24 (TLP, 4.01). 
From the foregoing now emerges the idea of "logical form." With respect 
to pictures, Wittgenstein explained the point in this way: the connection of the 
elements of a picture he calls its "structure;" and the possibility of such structure 
he calls "the pictorial form of the picture." Connecting these terms with the 
remarks we covered earlier produces the idea that "pictorial form is the possibility 
that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the 
picture" (TLP, 2.15-. 151). Corresponding to the pictorial form of a picture is the 
logical form of a proposition. Like pictorial form, logical form is the possibility 
that things are related to one another in the way the proposition represents them. 
What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with 
reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in 
any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality. (TLP, 2.18) 
The logical form of a proposition, then, is that feature of the proposition that 
"mirrors" the possibilities of states of affairs in the world, one of which 
possibilities is asserted to obtain by the particular proposition at hand. 
The importance for the Tractarian theory of the ideas of pictorial and logical 
form cannot be over-stressed. On the one hand they are central to Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy as the study of the possible. On the other they are the 
pivotal notions in the idea of a limit to what can be said. Once again, consider 
pictures first. We have said that what a picture "depicts" is a situation while, in 
so doing, it also "displays" the possibility that things are related in the manner 
depicted. What Wittgenstein notices here is that there is a fundamental difference 
between depiction and display. The argument is laid out as follows: 
A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture 
can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. A 
picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it. A 
picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint 
is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its 
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subject correctly or incorrectly. A picture cannot, however, place itself 
outside its representational form. (TLP, 2.171-.174) 
Thus, like pictorial form, the logical form of a proposition displays the form of 
the world—that is, its possibilities—whereas the proposition itself asserts that a 
particular situation obtains. And, like the pictorial form of the picture that cannot 
be depicted but only displayed, the logical form of a proposition is something that 
can not be asserted (said) but only displayed (shown). "It shows itself' in the 
proposition. 
The attempt to say that which can only be shown will result in nonsense. 
The classic instances of philosophical nonsense will arise, on this view, from 
attempts to frame propositions that describe or explain the connections between 
the logical form of propositions and the form of the world. A notable case of 
such nonsense will of course be much of the Tractatus itself: 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone 
who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when 
he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so 
to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (TLP, 
6.54) 
But nearly the entire metaphysical tradition in Western philosophy will fall into 
the category of nonsense as well. The age-old ontological categories of substance 
and accident (or, object and property, to use a more current philosophical jargon) 
will be regarded as nonsensical precisely because they derive from an attempt to 
say what the most general features of the world must be in order for our 
understanding of the world to be what it is. The generation of these categories 
in philosophy can be thought of as the result of asserting of the world that it must 
correspond to the subject-predicate construction of our grammar. Against the 
intelligibility of the traditional "ontological categories" Wittgenstein held that the 
form of the world cannot be said; it must (can only) be shown. 
It is now well-documented that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was not 
primarily concerned with this kind of nonsense—metaphysical nonsense—as the 
Vienna Circle positivists and their followers mistakenly believed.25 The actual 
focus of his concerns was on issues the expression of which in propositional form 
would also result in nonsense but which have to do with the most important 
things in life: the sense of the world, ethics, aesthetics, the mystical. Here we 
have a second limit to the sayable or, perhaps, a second aspect of the limit just 
described. In any case, the last passages of the Tractatus are taken up with the 
following argument' since all propositions are concerned only with what is true 
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or false, "all propositions are of equal value" (TLP, 6.4). But this just means 
that, qua proposition, no proposition can express anything of value. Once again, 
but with a fundamental difference, we arrive at something that cannot be said and 
must be shown. The difference is, of course, that there is a role for language to 
play in the displaying of value. The relevant influences here aie Kierkegaard 
(who, like Wittgenstein, believed that the most valuable matters could be 
discussed but only indirectly, through the medium of stories that had a capacity 
for revelation) and Tolstoy (whose short stories Wittgenstein took to be especially 
important in his own life). 
Related to these limits (or aspects of the limit) to the sayable is a third, that 
of what Wittgenstein called "the metaphysical subject" We can make this out 
first, once again, as a feature of pictures. Just as the pictorial form of a picture 
cannot be depicted but only displayed by the picture, so also the one who pictures 
facts to herself is not depicted within the picture. Wittgenstein uses the eye and 
the visual field to illustrate the point. 
. . . nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an 
eye . . . For the form of the visual field is surely not like this 
Eye 
(TLP, 5.633-5.6331) 
It is in this connection that Wittgenstein makes the famous remarks that 
"what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said" and that "the 
limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits 
of my world" (TLP, 5.62). What is usually not remembered when these lines are 
quoted is that Wittgenstein's position does not entail that we cannot 'say' 
anything about human beings. It is only for the "metaphysical subject" that the 
above statements hold: 
There really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in 
a non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the 
fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical self is not the 
human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which 
psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the 
world—not a part of it. (TLP, 5.641) 
^ 
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The distinction Wittgenstein draws here owes something to the Kantian distinction 
between the empirical subject and the subject required for the thematic unity of 
apperception. Indeed they perform similar functions in the structures of their 
respective theories.26 
Before turning to Handke's use of the Tractarian theory that I have just 
sketched, we need to grasp two further facts about the Tractarian view of 
language. The first fact is that the Tractatus gives no account of the acquisition 
of language, of how language (understood in Tractarian terms) could be learned. 
The second fact is that, when one does try to extract an account of language 
learning from the Tractatus, its view of meaning begins to unravel. This point 
was expressed by Wittgenstein in his later work, most notably in the 
Philosophical Investigations, by way of an argument that the picture theory of 
meaning is mistaken because it has the implication that all languages are second 
languages. As we will see, this point appears to be assumed and exploited by 
Handke—not as an argument against the Tractarian theory of meaning but as a 
pretext for and a form of play. 
To see why the Tractarian view is committed to construing any language as 
a second language, consider how one is to be taught the meaning of any stretch 
of sound. Kaspar suggests one alternative to us: after losing his sentence, Kaspar 
simply starts to repeat bits of the Prompters' sentences until he can do it himself 
without prompting. But how is it that we know (and, more importantly, that he 
knows) he is getting it right? We know because we see him come to use the 
word "table," for example, in one of the ways already familiar to us. But this 
does not explain how he is to know. In fact this is left almost completely 
untreated in the play; and that gap itself contributes significantly to the feeling 
that meaning assignments are arbitrary and therefore under the control of the 
Prompters. However, it is also significant that the primary way such words are 
employed in the play is in reference to objects presented to us. This is that use 
of words I have just mentioned as "one of the ways familiar to us." And this 
is entirely consistent with the Tractarian picture of meaning in which the criterion 
for establishing meaning could only be stipulative ostension of objects named 
within situations asserted to obtain. 
But ostension is clearly not a self-certifying procedure. As Wittgenstein 
showed in the Philosophical Investigations, ostension itself requires something 
like prior understanding of the kind of feature that is being pointed to.27 If I 
point to a book and say "book," how is the child to know that it is the object 
itself, and not its color, size, or shape to which I am pointing? Unless she has 
the appropriate preparation ostension simply cannot succeed. The necessary 
preparation includes familiarity not only with kinds of features but also with 
pointing gestures themselves. This can be seen by considering the question, 
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"When I point, how is she to know to follow out the line of my index finger, and 
not that of my thumb?" This preparation is, in effect, a training into the 
possession or mastery of certain behavior that is already linguistic or, at least, 
proto-linguistic. It shares the kind of intentionality one finds in verbal 
expressions of joy, of pain, of curiosity, and so on. Ostension, in sum, can only 
succeed for people who already possess some (at least rudimentary) language (or 
linguistic behavior). This is why ostension is one effective technique employed 
in teaching a second language. But the important upshot in the present context 
is that the picture theory of meaning is committed to presenting all language-
learning as the result of ostension; and, since ostension already presupposes some 
linguistic behavior, the view we are considering must also hold that all language 
is second language. 
But, of course, it is not. 
IV: A construction of Handke's achievement in Kaspar 
We are now in a position to begin sketching out how the Tractatus provides 
Handke the material with which he plays in Kaspar. Central to the design of the 
Tractatus is Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as the study of what is 
possible—that is, of what makes meaning possible and of the consequences of the 
occurrence of meaning within just those possibilities. 
A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always 
important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And that is 
generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns 
out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case 
discloses something about the essence of the world. (TLP, 3.3421) 
Hence, for Wittgenstein, philosophy is the study of form: for, "form is the 
possibility of structure" (TLP, 2.033). One suggestion worth making immediately 
is that Handke could bring the Tractatus into the theater by associating the notion 
of "play" with that of the "investigation of the possible." But it will also be 
remembered that Handke is concerned, more specifically, with plays of 
contradictions. This raises an interesting question: what if one were to try to 
present the Tractarian view of meaning and simultaneously confront it with its 
own implied but self-refuting view of language learning? 
It is immediately evident that the teaching of even a second language must 
be distorted in such a presentation. In ordinary second-language learning (and 
quite apart from the special issue of catching on to idiomatic expressions) there 
must be a fairly wide range of contact between the memorized vocabulary and 
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grammar and the lived circumstances in which the language is used. And that 
range of contact must be far wider than mere ostensive teaching can provide. 
This is what I meant earlier when I wrote that ostension is one effective 
technique for teaching a second language. The point here is that, in a theory of 
meaning in which the only effective teaching technique is ostension, not only is 
all language second language but also all teaching is insistence, coercion. Where 
there is no interrelation between linguistic, pre-linguistic and non-linguistic 
intention and behavior to be invoked and relied upon in the teaching, the teacher 
can only point and threaten until the learner repeats. This is precisely the method 
of the Prompters in Kaspar. It is also the reason Kaspar, just at the point of 
recognition in the final sequence, remarks, "Already with my first sentence I was 
trapped." It too was implanted by force. 
It cannot have been otherwise. Consider that first sentence: "I want to be 
a person like somebody else was once." Kaspar's first utterance of the sentence 
has him repeat it several times until it becomes clear to the audience that he does 
not understand it This is followed immediately by the moment when he utters 
the sentence as though doing various things with it: giving a command, asking 
a question, expressing relief. This, in turn, is followed by a passage in which 
Kaspar tries out various encounters with objects on the stage while the Prompters 
extol the virtues of his sentence: 
"Already you have a sentence with which you can make yourself 
noticeable . . . You can explain to yourself how it goes with you . . . 
You have a sentence with which you can bring order into every 
disorder . . ." (K, 67 & 69) 
There is some kind of development here—all of it occurring before he has his 
sentence "exorcised." It appears we are to see Kaspar as being stripped of a 
language, small but his own, when the Prompters set to work at undermining him. 
But to see him as possessing language prior to the exorcism we must assume it 
too is a second language. In the first moment, there is no difference between 
Kaspar's behavior and that of a parrot—it is not even clear that we should 
describe him as "speaking." In the second, his behavior is clearly that of a 
language-user—but there is no wider behavioral context provided for any of the 
things Kaspar "does" with his sentence that would make that particular sentence 
intelligible as a command, a question, or an expression of any feeling whatever. 
This is not to say that one just couldn't intelligibly use that sentence to issue a 
command, ask a question, express fear, or whatever. But it should remind us that 
Handke intends for nothing to be presented to the audience except the utterance 
of the sentence in the intonations characteristic of commands, questions, and so 
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forth. Since intonation alone is insufficient for an utterance actually to be a 
command, a question, or what have you, we are here being asked to see Kaspar 
as already linguistically competent and trying out this sentence as a new, second, 
language—one that was forced upon him just before he came onstage, perhaps, 
and with which he therefore is at the outset not sufficiently familiar to achieve 
anything. 
Looking at Kaspar as a play in which the Tractarian theory of meaning is 
both embodied and confronted with its own implied view of language-learning 
takes us a considerable distance towards explaining how the sense of alienation 
from one's language and oneself is induced in the play. In this "play of 
contradictions" all teaching is coercive insistence and one's language is never 
one's own. This pairing of coercion and a kind of dispossession is presented 
graphically in the play's most striking images: the visual image of the puppet-like 
Kaspar with the frozen mask that at first does not appear to be a mask, and the 
auditory image of the Prompter's voices sounding as though they were produced 
by the use of "technical media." The face of the mask is, at once, all there is to 
see and never Kaspar's own. And the face, because it is a mask with a 
predetermined expression, is imposed heteronomously. The use of "technical 
media" for the presentation of the Prompters' voices flows from the picture 
theory of meaning itself—where our language is explained as a kind of 
disembodied notation interposed between our selves and the world. The sense of 
language as always a second language is parlayed in Kaspar into a picture of 
alienation—an inescapable alienation: with our first utterances we are already 
trapped. 
This way of reading Kaspar also illuminates the connections among the 
sense of alienation from one's language and oneself (just described), the absence 
of characters, and the sense that while there is no history here there is a kind of 
plot to the events in the play. We can see how this reading helps us get a handle 
on these interrelated issues by first asking "Who are the other Kaspars?" 
Whatever the answer(s) might be to that question, there are some answers that 
cannot be given: e.g., his family. Indeed we can almost exclude in advance any 
answer that makes out the other Kaspars as capable of any personal relationship 
to Kaspar 1, that is, any relationship in which the problem could arise of their 
being genuine (enemies, lovers, friends). Just think how difficult it would 
be—and how much at odds with the explicit directions given in the script—even 
to attempt a presentation of them as casual acquaintances. The importance of this 
lies in its reminding us that there is nothing in the play—just as there is nothing 
in the Tractatus—to suggest how we employ language in anything like an 
everyday relationship, let alone in a relationship to which we might (correctly or 
incorrectly) attach some weight, some value. Had there been, attention would 
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have been drawn to situations in which relationships were begun, discovered, 
disturbed, destroyed, made firm or tenuous, or the like. Lacking this, there is 
nothing in the play—just as there is nothing in the Tractalus—that is anything 
like any actual situation where our language may, as we may, have life. 
I do not, in the foregoing, intend to rule out alternative interpretations of the 
other Kaspars. They might just be Kaspar, either as alter-egos or pieces of a 
fragmented self; they might be emblems of a kind of stultifying sameness that all 
characters in all plays have; they might be the Prompters, now, so to speak, 
internalized; or what have you. Nor do I think that the most interesting 
interpretation of the Kaspars is to be laid out in terms of their being separate 
individuals. But, if we try to construe them as individuals, their very 
individuality becomes the least interesting thing about them, they function in 
ways other than the ones for which individuating traits are important, and the 
language of interchange between people who interact with each other on the basis 
of even minimal interest in human similarities and differences is wholly lacking 
in the play. 
What is true of the "other Kaspars" is also true of Kaspar. These are not 
human beings, not human bodies, not human souls with which psychology might 
be concerned—they are, if anything, "the metaphysical subject"—and, in this 
play, that subject is very much in trouble. Playing back the idea that all language 
is second language now puts into question the claim that "the world is my world" 
that "this is manifest in the fact that the limits of my language (of that language 
which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world." The subject that is 
supposed to author pictures of the world now finds—at the less than benign 
insistence of the Prompters—that he has no authorship here. Furthermore, what 
is true of Kaspar is also true of the Prompters—hence, once again, thé 
presentation of their voices as though "technical media" interposed between them 
and the world. 
The absence of stories in the play is now to be expected. Earlier I remarked 
that if we were to take any of these figures as human beings—as people whom, 
for example, one might care for, dislike, find interesting, boring, amusing—there 
would have to have been the kind of showing in the play of something of the life 
of these figures. To show that is to tell a story. But just insofar as these figures 
are all aspects of the "metaphysical subject" no story about them is possible. We 
are left then with a sequence of events—but not a story. 
We might have anticipated this from what we already understood of the 
Tractatus. Telling a story is a particular way of relating events. Plotting is 
involved. To plot is to shape the telling of the events in such a way that they are 
(in the main) comprehensible to some community.28 What makes events 
comprehensible to us, and what a story provides that a spare listing of the events 
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does not, is a sense of why they happen in a particular order, a sense of cause 
and effect, and especially a sense of intentionality. The Tractarian picture theory 
of meaning has been shown to be completely incapable of explaining even the 
simplest sort of causal connections.29 For, while a picture can depict something 
that is the case (and so may illustrate a causal law), without appeal to that which 
is not in the picture it cannot show why what is the case is so; and, so, a picture 
cannot so much as state causal laws. NOT is the Tractarian theory rescued on this 
point by possibilities of sequences of pictures. Each picture represents an "atomic 
fact," as it were. But explanation, one wants to say, happens 'between' the 
pictures. Offering an explanation consists of saying that one fact occurs because 
or in consequence of the other surrounding facts. Listing those facts provides the 
material with which an explanation might be formulated, but not the explanation 
itself. It follows, by the same reasoning, that the Tractarian account is utterly 
devoid of the resources necessary for accounting for events that are connected by 
human intention and agency. On this reading of Kaspar (in which the Tractarian 
theory of meaning is contradicted by its own implied theory of language 
acquisition), it is clear now how the alienation from language is connected to the 
absence of character and how that, in turn, is connected to the absence of a story 
in Kaspar. It is clear, in short, how Handke has been successful in avoiding 
narrative representation. 
Nevertheless there is still much in Kaspar that suggests a story, a plot. One 
thing that makes this suggestion is that there are several recognizable plot 
elements, or 'plot-devices,' in the play. There is, for example, at least one 
"recognition scene" (albeit disrupted).30 Of course, by itself, the presence of one 
or more such scenes does not guarantee the presence of a "plot," if by that we 
mean "a structured underlying story." Ionesco's The Bald Soprano is famous 
both for being genuinely plotless and containing a hilarious inverted and parodie 
recognition scene. What shows that The Bald Soprano is plotless, I think, is the 
fact that the order of its scenes could be completely rearranged without loss of 
comprehension (although there might be some loss of effect). In contrast, Kaspar 
is not a spare sequence of unrelated pictures whose order could be so reversed 
or rearranged.31 Indeed if one follows the sequence of events as determined by 
the lighting directions the sequence has a rhythmic structure that carries the feel 
of a fairly standard plot development: introduction of characters, exposition of the 
situation, conflict, rising action, climax, denouement. 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that Kaspar must, after all, 
contain an underlying narrative. Nor should we conclude that there is such a 
narrative but that Handke fails to make it (or allow it to) hang together. The 
presence of a pattern of plot development no more automatically entails that there 
is a plotted story afoot than does the presence of isolated individual plot-devices. 
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A piece of music can have the same feel of patterned development; but we would 
not necessarily conclude that, upon listening, we had heard a story related in 
which event was related to event by some character's intentions.32 What is 
required, more than this, for a setting forth of some events to be a plotting of a 
story is reference to the failed or realized intentions of human beings (or things 
that can be made to act like them) that connects events in the manner we 
recognize as narrative. But it is the representation of just precisely such 
intentions that Handke successfully avoids throughout Kaspar. What we have at 
the level of structure is parallel to what we have seen at the level of events. Just 
as Kaspar does not act but only represents the possibility of actions, so the whole 
play presents a patterned sequence of events that is not a plotted story but an 
empty representation of the possibility of plots. Handke has been playing with 
"the investigation of the possible" throughout the play. 
VI: Measuring Handke's achievement 
So far, I have argued that Handke has succeeded in realizing his intentions 
in Kaspar, both those discovered in the play itself and those stated elsewhere. 
This conclusion has been attained by locating what Handke, in constructing the 
thematics of Kaspar, uses from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and by analyzing how 
he uses it. But I also think that a reconsideration of the Tractatus can both show 
us how Handke has succeeded in what he set out to achieve and also provide a 
means by which we can measure that as an "achievement." In particular it can 
allow us a way to discover what sort of liabilities, if any, might attach to 
adopting a set of themes and figures that are suggested by the structure and 
program of the Tractatus. 
The place to look for those liabilities is in the growing body of literature 
that documents and analyzes the ways in which people may lose, or in some 
cases never gain, the ability to articulate the important facts in and about their 
lives. Especially important to this task is that area of the literature that explores 
the possibility that a commitment to a particular philosophical theory might 
similarly disable us. Most of these explorations have focused on Logical 
Positivism and its legacy.33 This is convenient here because the theory of 
language with which the Vienna Circle and other Logical Positivists were 
working is precisely that theory substantially worked out by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus. Their ends may have been different from his—and he may have seen 
an importance in the unsayable that they denied—but the mechanics of meaning 
arguably were the same. If there are things about our lives that the Tractarian 
theory actually prevents us from articulating, this will be important in providing 
a measure of Handke's achievement in Kaspar. 
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That depends, of course, on whether and how far Handke has bought into 
those aspects of the Tractarian theory that cause the impoverishment in question. 
For, clearly, Handke's turning of the theory on itself, the key strategy in Kaspar, 
does more than merely suggest Handke's own suspicions of the alienating 
character of the Tractarian theory. Nevertheless, in this conclusion I will sketch 
out three areas where the Tractarian theory—even in the criticized form of it we 
find in Kaspar—weakens Handke's ability to articulate important aspects of the 
alienation from language that he sets out to present in Kaspar. 
Alienation and failures of intention 
The first area I wish to survey concerns failures of intention. To be sure 
there is no explicit account of intentions and failures of intention in either the 
Tractatus or Kaspar. In both, however, that aspect of intention that is relevant 
to meaning can only be pictured as the intention to refer—to name. 
Correspondingly, failure of intention must be pictured as failure to secure 
reference. The relation between this picture and alienation is not hard to see. On 
the one hand there is an ancient perception of a connection between naming and 
dominion. And on the other, Handke's handling of the Tractarian theory, turning 
it back on itself, fairly easily produces the following argument: 
(a) If all language is second-language, all language-teaching is 
coercion. 
(b) If all language is second-language, language must be conceived as 
a technical medium interposed between thought and the world. 
(c) (In the Tractarian account) all language is second-language. 
Therefore: 
(d) (In the Tractarian account) no expression of thought in language 
can be genuine, i.e., an authentic expression of the person whose 
thought is being expressed. 
The premises here make it plain that the language I use can never be under my 
own control because it is always an external device under the control of those 
who teach the language. The expression of thought therefore is always mediated 
and distorted by issues of power. I am always alienated from my language. I 
can never name what I wish to name—that is, I can never give it a name that I 
control. 
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If we are attune to the difficulties besetting the Tractarian theory of 
meaning, we can readily see that this account, attractive as it might be, is at 
several levels both mistaken and inadequate for understanding alienated forms of 
failures of intention. At a technical level it can be noted that, although it is 
undeniable that power can be exercised over others by getting them to adopt our 
names for things, far greater power is brought into play by getting them to accept 
our descriptions of things and events. The Tractarian theory of meaning simply 
doesn't have the resources to trace either the real continuities or the 
discontinuities between names and descriptions. A more serious problem lies in 
the fact that the Tractarian picture of language use is entirely one-dimensional: 
on this picture language is entirely a fact-stating enterprise. But, as Wittgenstein 
was later to come to see, language is a labyrinth of different kinds of activities, 
it is a varied collection of forms of action that have non-trivial and varied 
connections (and disconnections) with our non-linguistic and pre-linguistic desires 
and intentions.34 To describe our language requires describing our lives. It is 
easy to see that the range of intentions connected with what we mean to do with 
a given stretch of language is far richer than merely the intention to name some 
thing or refer to a set of facts.35 And, as for those cases in which alienation is 
a matter of unrealized or unrealizable intentions, this too can take varied forms, 
not all of which are reducible to failure to fix one's own reference of the names 
one already has in hand. For example, one may consciously feel the need to 
describe something but not even have the relevant vocabulary within which to do 
so. It is noteworthy that a case of this kind is not helpfully thought of as a 
problem arising from language always being a second-language; here the problem 
might indeed be aided by the acquisition of something like a second language, 
viz., a new stretch of one's first language that is hitherto unknown. 
Alienation as loss 
Those who are interested in understanding what is involved in alienation, 
including alienation from one's own language, ought to be concerned to explicate 
the fact that when one becomes conscious of that alienation this is experienced 
as loss. As early as 1844 Marx stresses this point by using the term 
"estrangement" for the phenomena.36 What makes the picturing of language as 
second-language initially attractive as a figure for estrangement, and hence as a 
way of expressing the relevant kinds of loss, is precisely that second languages 
either never have or only after many years can come to have the feeling of 
intimacy one has with one's first language. But this feature actually gets denied 
in a theory and a picture that relies on a theory that takes all language to be 
second-language. The very contrast that could be used to explicate estrangement 
as the loss of a prior or a possible intimacy is itself lost. 
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A related issue concerns the ways in which an expression can be either 
"full" or "empty" of meaning for us.37 Consider the expression, "Don't judge 
another until you've walked a while in her shoes." For most of us for whom this 
expression once seemed full of meaning and wisdom, the expression must now 
seem a little thin. We don't walk as much as we used to. So we don't see the 
world (our own or that of others) at a walking pace. We are simply less 
reflective in our daily lives. We do not have time for that. No doubt we may 
have a kind of nostalgic attachment to what we take to be the wisdom involved 
in the expression. But how are we to transmit that wisdom to our children? 
"Don't judge a person until you've driven home from school in her Honda 
Civic"? Once again it is noteworthy that the kinds of loss of meaning involved 
here take place within our first language. No representation in terms of a second 
language is either necessary or helpful in the explication of alienation of this sort. 
Alienation and false consciousness 
Classical accounts of alienation have held that those who are alienated but 
unaware of their alienation possess a kind of "false consciousness."38 There are 
varied accounts of how in detail we are to understand this. Whatever it comes 
to it seems to involve people accepting, as if it were both accurate and satisfying, 
a set of beliefs about themselves and their roles and identities that is both 
inaccurate and disabling to them as real active human agents. Once again, where 
the alienation in question is from one's own language, the picture of language as 
second language is both an initially attractive figure but ultimately self-defeating 
in its analysis of the phenomena. 
More important than this technical objection however is the fact that the 
kinds of beliefs involved in false consciousness cannot even be represented in a 
Tractarian theory of meaning. For they are not, or are not merely, beliefs about 
"what is the case" but about what is important and significant in life and about 
how our lives are connected to what is important and significant. Wittgenstein's 
theory explicitly holds that what is of value is not directly expressible. Similarly 
Handke's Kaspar is rendered incapable of expressing what is important, by 
language itself. For both, what is significant in life cannot be spoken. Handke's 
Kaspar can be taken to show us that, were that theory true, we should still resist 
the dictum that "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." But 
an account of the false consciousness that often accompanies alienation simply 
cannot be made out in these terms. False consciousness is not silence nor 
acquiescence in silence over the unutterable. Nor is overcoming false 
consciousness a matter of resisting silence. Both false consciousness and its 
overcoming presuppose the intelligibility—an ordinary everyday intelligibility—of 
expressions of what is important to us. 
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We must conclude therefore with a mixed assessment of Kaspar. No doubt 
it achieves the goals Handke set for himself with respect to the selection (and 
eschewal) of particular theatrical means. But, precisely because it buys into too 
much of the Tractarian theory in order to secure those selections, it must also be 
less effective at achieving the broader ideological goals in the service of which 
those selections of means were made.39 
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